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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. Error in Court refusing defendant the right of
cross-examination.

2. Error in Courfs refusal to permit evidence of
warranty.
3. Error in Court taking position that response to
leading questions would be ignored whether objected to
or not.

4. Error in Court's failure to impose duty on vendor
to furnish equipment that would sustain its own weight and
refusal to impose liability for damages directly and naturally resulting therefrom in the ordinary course of events.

5. Error under the facts submitted to impose duty on
vendor to furnish equipment capable of moving items of
weight represented by vendee to be moved.
6. Error in Court's refusal to apply the law charging
vendor with damages sustained directly and naturally and
within the contemplation of the parties.
7. Error of the Court in finding that the defendant
vendee was warned of probable failure of performance because of long wheel base since same is contrary to the
evidence.
8. Error of the defendant in finding vendee had requested the truck delivered since such finding is contrary
to the evidence.
9. Finding that vendee could have corrected the defective equipment is contrary to the evidence and such
finding cannot sustain the judgment being contrary to
the law.
10. Error in the
the difficulty was or
reasonable diligence
of law that such a
as entered.

Court finding that vendee knew what
could have known by the exercise of
and error in concluding as a matter
finding would sustain the judgment
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and counter-claimant was a contractor engaged in road building for about 25 years, R 87. Plaintiff
operated an automotive truck sales agency in Salt Lake
City, Utah, R 77. Defendant entered into negotiations for
the purchase of a truck, in response to an advertisement,
with an agent of the plaintiff, R 88, 89. The truck was to
be used in road building work and defendant specified the
particular type of a truck, referred to in the transcript as
one like the "Strong" truck, or "Strong & Grant" truck.
This truck was understood by the parties to be capable of
hauling a 25 ton Cat., R 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 178, 250,
288, 289, 290, 293. The plaintiffs had sold the particular
"Strong" truck in question, and the defendant had seen
the same and ordered one exactly like the "Strong" truck,
see Exhibit 1 for contract of sale, and R 136, 289, 370.
Thereafter plaintiff approached defendant and indicated
that the truck plaintiff had sold defendant might not be
entirely satisfactory, and that defendant should have a different type truck costing several thousand dollars more and
recommended and urged defendant to buy a truck of the
size and dimensions suggested by plaintiff, R 98, 99,
370, 374, 560. Plaintiff went out to the place where defendant kept all of his equipment to measure some other
equipment and saw the equipment, including the tanks
and shovels and Cats., and recognized that this equipment
was to be used and hauled, and at the time of examination
it was within the contemplation of the parties that the truck
ordered would satisfactorily handle the equipment on the
premises, R 100, 101, 103, 521, 522. Defendant acquiesced
and permitted plaintiff to place the order for the newly
suggested truck costing $16,522.00 and cancelled the order
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for the truck originally ordered under Exhibit 1, upon the
recommendations of the plaintiff that he do so, R 99, 100,
101, 103, Exhibit 1.
Trucks were very hard to secure and purchase and it
was almost impossible to buy one without waiting a year
or more for delivery of same, R 111, 532. Defendant received delivery of the buck and each time he attempted
to use the same the front tires would blow out and they
would get so warm that they would catch on fire and bum
because of the excess weight on the front end, R 121, 122,
125, 126. Front tires blew out when the truck was empty,
R 125. The front tires would blow out because of the truck
being improperly designed and the weight all shifted onto
the front, R 123. Because of the long wheel base the drive
shafts were so long that they would whip and tear out,
R 116, 118, 120, 193, and the defendant did replace them
and sued for the recovery for replacing these drive shafts
on the improperly designed truck, R 6. The defendant did
not know what was wrong with the truck, or what caused
tires to blow out, R 113, 545. Both plaintiff and defendant
weighed the front end of the truck at the suggestion of
a tire dealer who refused to sell new tires to be used on
the truck, which weighing was done prior to the time that
defendant sustained damage caused by the plaintiff, R 128,
129, 130. The tire dealer told plaintiff and defendant the
front end was overloaded when empty and gave this as the
reason why he would not sell new tires for the truck. The
plaintiff was not skilled in truck designing and the plaintiff purported to be skilled and represented himself as an
authority on the matter, and the tire dealer indicated that
the tires would blow out if the truck were operated empty
since the front was overloaded when driven empty, R 128,
129, 130.
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Plaintiff had a contract for hauling 63 carloads of oil
for road building near McGill, Nevada, which oil was to
be hauled in the late summer of 1947, and plaintiff was
fully informed of the oil hauling contract, R 103, 139, 140.
It cost the defendant to haul this oil by rail $25,834.00, see
Exhibit 4 and R 140. Defendant could have hauled the
same by using this truck, had the truck been properly
designed, as it was later changed and redesigned, for a
total cost to the defendant of $5,000.00, which would include depreciation, costs of operation and all costs for the
hauling of the entire 63 carloads of oil, R 168, 145, 146,
147, 338. The oil was hauled subsequent to June of 1947,
and the defendant was thereby damaged in the sum of
$20,000.00, being the difference between what it cost the
plaintiff to haul the oil by rail, Exhibit 4, and what the oil
could have been hauled for, had the truck been so built
as to permit the hauling of the same, or had it been altered,
as it was later altered in design, to permit satisfactory
operation. The truck purchased from the plaintiff was required to remain idle from the time it was purchased until
it was redesigned. Mter the oil had been hauled by rail
and after many contacts requesting that the truck be redesigned vendor plaintiff received a newly designed truck
which was of the same general construction except that
it was engineered and designed and properly balanced.
Plaintiff vendor told defendant that this was a newly designed truck properly balanced and that he could bring
his truck in now and that they could redesign the truck
using the newly designed truck on the floor as a sample,
R 392, 393, 514, 515, 519. This remodeling and redesigning
of the truck consisted of the cutting off of 5 feet of the
frame and changing four drive shafts, R 173, 177, 387, 388.
The redesigning and rebalancing of the chassis using the
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other truck as a 1nodel was done without cost to the defendant Yendee and took -!0 days, R 133, 363, 394. After
the redesigning the truck operated satisfactorily and hauled
a carload of oil on each trip and all other equipment that
had been represented to be hauled, R 132, 143, 173. The
same month that the truck was redesigned at no cost to
the defendant vendee a new set of tires was supplied to
replace the old ones, R 6. Plaintiff sued to recover for the
tires that were so supplied to the truck and for the repairs
to the drive shafts that went out while the truck was
practically new and was awarded judgment therefore in
the sum of $1,579.00, R 6, 60.
Defendant claimed that the tires and drive shafts were
merely making good the guarantee on the truck, R 116,
119, 120, 300, and that defendant had been damaged and
counter-claimed for $20,000.00 claiming that it was within
the contemplation of the parties that the truck would be
used for road building and that the fact that the truck
would not permit the hauling of oil or the hauling of any
weight resulted in $25,000.00 being expended to haul the
oil when the same could have been hauled for $5,000.00,
had the truck been properly designed, R 29, 33, or had
the same been redesigned prior to June or July in the year
the oil was hauled.
The Court refused to permit the claims of the defendant with respect to tires or parts as coming within the
guarantee and also denied defendant's right to recover
any damages for selling a truck improperly designed, or
for furnishing a truck that would not move any weight
without blowing out its tires.
Defendant vendee could not change the design without taking a chance of violating a notice that drilling of
any holes in the frame destroyed the warranty, R 516. De-

)/
)
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fendant vendee had demanded alterations to be made to
permit satisfactory operations fifty times, R 542, and had
done so in May prior to any damage sustained and sued
for R 133, and had refused to pay for the drive shaft installations, claiming and requesting modifications prior to
any damage sustained, R 116, 119. Plaintiff vendee admitted
certain guarantee, R 300 ,and that the company never
did advise against building the truck under specifications
requested by vendor or plaintiff, R 385.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
\V. J. TREADWAY, VEDA GENE
TREADWAY, and J. E. TREADWAY,
co-partners doing business
under the firm name and style
of KENNETH SALES COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

No. 7417
Case

vs.
HEBER GLENN,
Defendant and Appellant.

SUMMARY OF FACTS
Defendant and Counter-claimant was a contractor engaged in road building for more than 17 years. The plaintiff operated an automotive truck sales agency in Salt Lake
City, Utah. Defendant entered into negotiations for the
purchase of a truck in response to an advertisement with
an agent of plaintiff. The truck was to be used in road
building work and defendant specified the particular type
of a truck referred to in the transcript as one like "the
Strong Truck," or "Strong & Grant Truck." This truck was
known by all parties to be capable of hauling a 25 ton Cat.
The plaintiff had sold the particular "Strong" truck in question and the defendant had seen the same and ordered one
exactly like the "Strong" truck, Exhibit 1. Thereafter, the
plaintiff approached defendant and indicated that plaintiff's
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agent had sold defendant a truck that might not be entirely
satisfactory and that he should have a different type truck
costing several thousand dollars more, and recommended
and urged him to buy a truck of size and dimensions suggested by the plaintiff. The plaintiff went out to the place
of business of the defendant to measure the equipment and
saw the tanks that were to be put on the truck and the
Cats. and shovels and equipment that was to be used at
the time of making the suggestion, and it was within the
contemplation of the plaintiff and defendant that the truck
was to be used for the hauling of oil in the tanks and for
the use by defendant in his road building work, and that
the truck would at least haul 25 tons. Defendant acquiesced
and permitted plaintiff to place the order for the newly
suggested truck costing $16,522.00 and cancelled the order
for the truck ordered under Exhibit 1 upon the recommendations of the plaintiff that he do so. Trucks were very
hard to secure and purchase and it was almost impossible
to buy one without waiting for a year or more to secure
delivery of the same.
Defendant received delivery of the truck and each time
he attempted to use the same the front tires would blow
out whether the truck was empty or loaded and the drive
shafts were so long they would whip and break down and
broke down on two occasions, requiring installations and
repairs. The plaintiff installed the new drive shafts and
discussed with the defendant the difficulties in connection
with the blowing of tires when riding empty prior to the
time of the damages sustained by the defendant for which
defendant counter-claimed for damages. The defendant
did not know what was wrong with the truck or what
caused the tires to blow out. Both plaintiff and defendant
weighed the front end of the truck at the suggestion of a
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tire dealer who refused to sell new tires for the truck prior
to the time that any damages were sustained by defendant
and. determined that there was too much weight on the
front end of the truck. The tire dealer told plaintiff and
defendant the front was overloaded when empty and gave
this as the reason why he would not sell new tires for the
truck. The defendant was not skilled in truck designing,
and the plaintiff purported to be skilled and represented
himself as an authority on the matter.
The plaintiff had a contract for hauling 63 carloads of
oil for road building near McGill, Nevada, which oil was
to be hauled in the summer of 1947. It cost the defendant
to haul the same by railroad $25,834.00, Exhibit 4. Defendant could have hauled the same by his truck, had the truck
been properly designed, as it was later changed and as
redesigned for a cost of $5,000.00, which would include
depreciation and all costs of operation of the truck for
hauling the entire 63 carloads of oil. The oil was to be
hauled subsequent to June, 1947, and defendant was thereby damaged in the sum of $20,000.00, being the difference
what it cost to haul and what the oil could have been
hauled for, had the truck been so built as to permit the
hauling of the same. The truck purchased from the plaintiff
was required to remain idle all this time because it could
not be operated without blowing out the front tires. Mter
the oil had all been hauled by rail plaintiff vendor had
another truck delivered to his place of business which was
the same truck in almost each respect as that delivered to
defendant except that it was properly designed, weight
balanced and had a shorter wheel base. This newly designed
truck was delivered to plaintiff's place of business about one
year after defendant had received the truck involved in
this litigation. After having made many demands the plain-
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tiff took the defendant's truck into his place of business
and used the other newly designed truck as a design and·
model to redesign and shorten the wheel base of the truck
that had been sold to the defendant. This remodeling and
redesigning of the truck consisted of the cutting off of five
feet of the frame ,the moving of the rear wheel assembly
forward and the changing of the four interconnecting drive
shafts. This redesigning and the rebalancing of the chassis
was done without cost to the defendant and thereafter the
truck operated satisfactorily and hauled a carload of oil on
each trip. The same month the truck was redesigned at
no cost a new set of tires was supplied to replace the old
ones. The plaintiff sued to recover for the tires that were
so supplied to the truck and for the repairs to the drive
shafts that went out while the truck was practically new
and was awarded judgment therefore in the sum of
$1,579.00.
Defendant claimed that the tires and the drive shafts
were merely making good the guarantee on the truck, and
that the defendant had been damaged and counter-claimed
for $20,000.00, claiming that it was within the contemplation of the parties that the truck was to be used for road
building and that the fact that the truck would not permit
the hauling of the oil, or hauling of anything even its own
weight, resulted in $25,000.00 being expended to haul the
oil when the same could have been hauled for $5,000.00,
had the truck operated properly or had the same been
redesigned prior to June or July. The lower Court refused
to permit the claims of the defendant with respect to the
furnishing of the tires or the parts as coming within the
guarantee and also denied defendant's right to recover any
damages for the improper designing of the truck, or furnishing a truck that would not even move its own weight.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

ERROR IN REFUSING DEFENDANT RIGHT OF
CROSS-EXAMINATION.

The plaintiff was suing for the items listed in the Bill
of Particulars, R 6. These items included a set of tires, involving over One Thousand Dollars, and the replacing of
two sets of drive shafts. The defendant should have been
entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff on the issue of
whether the tires were second grade war tires or whether
they were merely replacing tires blown out by improper
designing of the truck and whether they were factory replacements without cost to plaintiff, whether or not the
drive shafts as replaced were replaced within the period
that the plaintiff had guaranteed the truck. What the
guarantee consisted of. Whether it was for a year or ten
thousand miles of operation that the guarantee extended.
Whether or not the extreme length of the truck, together
with the extra long interconnecting drive shafts caused a
whipping motion, tearing the same out and whether this
should have been replaced by the plaintiff under factory
guarantee, or under a guarantee from the plaintiff as the
dealer. Whether the factory paid for the tires or parts.
Note that at R 82, when the Court sustained an objection and defendant's attorney attempts to explain the reason
for the request to continue, the Court sharply interrupts
the attorney for the defendant, refuses to permit him to
even give his reasons, or continue cross-examination with
the sharp response, "The Court has ruled, Mr. Schoenhals.
You may proceed." Note also that the Court in its ruling
did not extend to counsel the usual courtesy of permitting
him to complete his reason for cross-examination, the re-
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porter indicating by dashes that the Court was talking at
the same time that the attorney for the defendant was talking. Counsel for defendant has never heretofore experienced or even heard of a case where the defendant was so
curtly denied the right of cross-examination without being
even permitted to give to the Court the reasons therefore
and being stopped in the middle of a sentence of explanation and notified that the Court had ruled.
70 C.

J.

p. 611

"§779 A party has a right to cross-examine witnesses who have testified for the adverse party and
this right is absolute and not a mere privilege 33
and, unless subject to cross-examination, a witness
cannot testify, 34 and it is not within the discretion
of the Court to say whether or not the right will be
accorded 35 ~ ~ "
There are many cases cited, among them a Utah case,
as well as an A. L. R. citation.
70 C. J.p. 615
"§ 782 The right to cross-examine witnesses

being absolute, 76 it should not be abridged 77

°

0
0

0

"

Note also that again another Utah case is cited.
58 Am. Jur. p. 340
"§ In a judicial investigation the right of crossexamination is absolute and not a mere privilege of
the one against whom a witness may be called 19."

Note here a Utah case is cited.
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58 Am. Jur. p. 340
"§ 612 It is generally held that he is entitled to
have the direct testimony stricken from the record."

Here we see again that the Court goes so far as to
hold that the evidence given by the plaintiff must be disregarded unless cross-examination is granted. These cases
go further than saying it is an abuse of discretion and
hold that it is mandatory to permit cross-examination. The
manufacturer might have supplied the parts and tires without cost to plaintiff and instructed him to supply same to
defendant without cost. Yet plaintiff forces defendant to
pay for same since defendant is not permitted to crossexamine.
POINT TWO

ERROR IN REFUSAL TO PERMIT EVIDENCE OF
WARRANTY.

At R 88-89, after having been denied the right of crossexamination, the defendant, in attempting to introduce into
the evidence an advertisement in which the vendor holds
himseH out as a des~gner of trucks and building trucks to
handle any situation, the defendant is again precluded from
introducing into the evidence or even examining on the
question. That such evidence was material and properly
admissible.
See:
55 C. J. p. 683, § 686
POINT THREE

ERROR IN COURT TAKING POSITION THAT
RESPONSE TO LEADING QUESTIONS WOULD BE
IGNORED WHETHER OBJECTED TO OR NOT.

At R 104 the Court announced, "I disregard answers
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to leading questions whether they are objected to or not."
For the Court to make such a pronouncement places the
attorney representing a client in a position where he is
unable to tell which evidence the Court is going to ignore
and which evidence the Court is going to receive. It likewise places the attorney for the client in a position where
the said client feels that the Court is favoring one side over
the other. The Court may be in error in holding a certain
question to be leading. If the Court is in error and just
ignores the response, the attorney is unable to ask a new
question satisfactory to the Court to make sure certain
evidence will be received. It places the attorney in a position where the attorney is fearful of proceeding and is unnerved, realizing that the Court might ignore any of the
evidence introduced. If an objection is made and sustained,
the attorney is then placed in a position of asking a question, or at least correcting what the Court concludes to be
a leading question whether the Court is right or wrong
so that counsel is certain the Court will consider the evidence. He can then properly try the case and have evidence before the Court which the Court has acknowledged
as being received, rather than being ignored, without any
notice to counsel that it has been ignored. The other side
might welcome a few leading question to speed up the
trial. Here the Court will not permit this.
POINT FOUR

VENDOR REQUIRED TO FURNISH EQUIPMENT
THAT WILL AT LEAST SUSTAIN ITS OWN WEIGHT
OR BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES DIRECTLY
AND NATURALLY RESULTING IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF EVENTS.
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"81-5-7 (6) The measure of damages for breach
of warranty is the loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the breach
of warranty."-U. C. A. 1943.
The legislature has spoken and has fixed the measure
of damages in cases of this kind:

ANDRUS v. HORNSBY
Tex. Civ. App. 238 S. W. 314
"Loss of profits due to the fact that a truck and
trailer represented to have a certain capacity had
a much less capacity was allowed. ~ ~ the buyer
took the seller to the section of the country where
he proposed to operate the truck, and explained to
him the necessity of a truck of a given capacity in
order to receive the compensation which he expected. The court said that evidence of loss of profit
was established with reasonable certainty."

MAWHINNEY v. PORTEOUS
17 Manitoba L. R. 184
" ~ ~ the buyer is entitled as part of his damage
to compensation for loss of profits from delays
during the time necessarily elapsing before the
machine could be put in the condition it was warranted to be in."

MAYFIELD v. GEORGE 0. RICHARDSON
MACHINERY CO.
231 S. W. 288, 208 Mo. App. 206
"Where a tractor proved worthless, the purchaser
was entitled to recover the loss of rental value of
one season's use of the land he was to plow, the
machine having been sold for plowing purposes and
warranted to pull a certain number of plows ~ ~ "
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EXCELLO HOSIERY MILLS v. HIRSCH

177 Atl. 96, N.

J.

"I am fully satisfied from the testimony adduced
on behalf of complainant that it had the orders
which were to be filled by use of the attachments,
and that the defendant company was apprised and
knew of these orders and undertook to deliver attachments which it warranted fit and suitable for
that purpose. The defendant company is therefore
liable for the special damages consisting of the loss
of the profits shown to have been sustained. 0 0 "
SURYAN v. LAKE WASHINGTON SHIPYARDS
300 Pac. 941, Wash.
" ~ ~ The defendant next contends that the trial
court erred in the allowance of damages on items
1 to 3, inclusive. These three items of damage resulted by reason of the defendant's breach of the
implied warranty. We have frequently laid down
the rule that all damages are recoverable that can
be said to have been reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
was entered into as a probable result in case of a
breach. 0 ~ "
"The defendant knew that the boat which it
constructed for the plaintiff was intended for use
as a fishing boat in Alaskan waters during the
herring season of 1928; knew that the fishing season
for herring in those waters was limited; and must
have contemplated that, if the boat proved unseaworthy through its faulty construction, it might
become necessary, when stress of weather arose, to
jettison the cargo and seek aid in order to save the
lives of the crew and bring the helpless boat into
port. So far as concerns the allowance for loss of
profits during the time the boat was laid up for
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necessary repairs, as awarded by the trial court on
item 1, it is sufficient to say that this court is committed to the doctrine that, in such a case as this,
prospective profits may be the basis of recovery if
they can be estimated with reasonable certainty. 0 0 "

° From this evidence the trial court found
that the plaintiff had lost in catch on those two days
800 barrels:~ and we are not disposed to disturb this
finding.''
0

"

AMERICAN OIL PUMP & TANK CO. v. FOUST

274 Pac. 323, Ore.
0

0

The defendant was entitled to equipment
which would operate:~ and to its daily use in his
business. A return to him of the payments he had
made upon the purchase price would not compensate him for his full damages, because he had purchased the equipment for use in a business which
was bringing him a profit. Both parties apparently
assumed that such a pump should render service
for more than five months' time. When it ceased
to operate, in the latter part of December, the defendant was unable to supply his customers with
gasoline. While there is no evidence upon the subject, we assume that similar pumps could be purchased from other manufacturers, and could be installed before any great period of time had passed.
The court's instructions authorized the jury to allow
the defendant compensation for such "a reasonable
time within which he could have removed this pump
and replaced it with a workable and usable
one. o o o ,
"

"But it is to be observed That, in our case, there
was substantial evidence to the effect that the plaintiff knew that the defendant expected to use this
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device in the operation of a business for profit. In
such instances, where the loss of profits in the event
of a breach, was within the contemplation of the
parties, a recovery limited to the rental value of the
device may not compensate fairly for the loss sustained during the period while an efficient machine
is being substituted for the defective one; the lost
profits are sometimes recoverable. Feeney & B. Co.
v. Stone, 89 Or. 360, 171 P. 569, 174 P. 152. See
the comprehensive note accompanying California
Press Mfg. Co. v. Stafford Pack. Co., 192 Cal.
479
-(!.

-(!.

"

"Such being the circumstance the court was of
necessity driven to the adoption of another measure
of compensation for the period of substitution of
equipment. It instructed the jury that, in determining the value of the use of the pump, "you would
be entitled to consider what his (defendant's)
average earnings had been over the five or six
months preceding the 27th day of December, 1925,
when it appears from the evidence that the pump
became unusable, merely for whatever it may be
worth to you in determining what was the reasonable value of the use of the pump to the defendant."
-o. -o. We do not believe that this instruction was
erroneous;

LOBDELL v. PARKER
3 La. 328
"It was held that for breach of warranty on the
sale of machinery for a sugar mill, due to defects
which rendered it unfit for the purpose intended,
might include the loss of profits on the sugar and
molasses which the buyer failed to make; the court,
however, said that these must not be valued at the
price at which they could have been sold in market,
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for the expense of grinding, manufacturing, carrying to
, market, etc., must be taken into consideration.

JORGENSEN v. GESSELL PRESSED BRICK CO.
45 Utah 31, 141 P. 460

"The measure of damages for breach of warranty
is the loss directly and naturally resulting, in the
ordinary course of events, from the breach of warranty. This is the ordinary rule as to general damages. But there may be a recovery in a proper case
for special as well as general damages, and such
damages as may fairly be supposed to have been
within the contemplation of the parties as a probable result of the breach are included.''

OLIVER FARM EQUIPMENT SALES CO.
v. RICH
42 P. 2d 604, Kan .
.. ~ ~ The Court held that where a manufacturer
sells a machine on a written order, describing it,
an express warranty of quality will not exclude an
implied warranty that the machine will do the things
necesarily implied by the description. There is
nothing in the express warranty which destroys the
obligation of the seller to deliver the engine described in the order. It is a matter of common knowledge that an engine that will neither develop nor
sustain power is of no value."
..Another objection was in allowing the defendant to testify that the tractor was worthless to him,
and which was not stricken out on the motion of
plaintiff. That was an issue in the case as made by
the pleadings, and the tests were made showing that
it was of no value to the plaintiff who purchased it
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for work which it failed to perform. It may not be
the best evidence of the fault in the tractor, but it
is clear that it was not material error."
STUDEBAKER BROS. CO. v. ANDERSON

50 U. 319, 167 Pac .. 663
The defendants (the buyers) according
to the undisputed testimony, applied to the plaintiff
for an automobile to use for a special purpose'something to carry people to and from the New
Grand Hotel and depot.' The plaintiff's salesman
met the defendants' application by representing it
had just such a car, 'We have exactly what you
want 0 0 0 ' We think from the foregoing statements made concerning the particular car in question something more was to be implied, as matter
of law, than that the plaintiff could sell the defendants a junk pile for an automobile, and then escape
liability therefor by saying such statements were
only 'seller's talk' 0 0 "
"

(t

(t

No question but what plaintiff sold defendant a junk
pile.
ROYAL PAPER BOX CO. v. MUNRO &
CHURCH CO.

188 N. E. 223, 284 Mass. 446
27 - 4th D. - 1103
"Mass. 1934. Damages for breach of implied
warranty that cardboard was fit for candy boxes
were not merely difference between value of cardboard as it was and value as it should have been,
but included damages resulting from reasonable
attempt to use cardboard prior to date when buyer
acquired knowledge of its condition. G. L., Ter.
Ed., c. 106, § 17 ( 1) .''
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GARY COAST AGENCY v. LAWREY
101 Or. 629, 201 Pac. 214
"When the buyer of an automotive truck informed the seller, a dealer, of the purpose for which
the truck was to be used, and the latter represented
that it was fit for that purpose, there was an implied
warranty of fitness. [Gary Coast Agency v. Lawrey
( 1921)] 101 Or. 629, 201 Pac. 214; Long v. FiveHundred Co. ( 1923) 123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559."
46 AM. JUR. 829
"§ 705.

0

0

Where there is a contract to sell an
article, such as a machine, for use by the buyer in
the performance of a collateral contract the terms
and conditions of which are known to the seller,
and the contract to sell is broken by a wrongful
failure or refusal to deliver or by a late delivery,
which breach results in a loss of profits to the buyer
in the performance of the collateral contract, such
loss of profits has been regarded in some cases as
being within the contemplation of the parties, and
the seller has been held liable therefor6 0 0 "
RUDOLPH WURLITZER CO. v.
KAUFMAN STRAUS CO.
116 S. W. 2nd 305
The statute, section 2651b-69, further
gives to a purchaser the right to recover any loss
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary
course of events from the breach of a warranty. The
evidence tended to prove that the plaintiff had lost
certain business by reason of the improper refrigeration of its fur storage plant, and we think this was
properly submitted."
"

0

0
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Note in the above case that with respect to the identical statute that the Court would require judgment for
counter-claimant in the case at Bar.
See also:
RUSSELL v. CORNING MFG. CO., 49 Appl. Div.
610, 63 NYS 640; COHN v. BESSEMER GAS ENGINE
CO., 44 Cal. A. 85, 186 P. 200; SINKER v. KIDDER,
24 N. E. 341; MAYFIELD v. GEORGE 0. RICHARDSON MACH. CO., 208 Mo. A 206, 231 SW 288; WOOD
v. CARLETON, 3 Silv. Sup. 509, 6 NYS 865; DENIVELLE
CO. v. LEONARD KEIL, 140 NYS 150; DWYER v. REDMOND 100 Conn. 393; HACKETT v. LEWIS, 173 Pac.
111; FARMERS BANK OF TRENTON v. RAY & SON,
167 S. W. 2d 963; BRYSON v. McCONE, 121 Cal. 153,
53 Pac. 637; FINDLEY vs. BREEDLOVE, 4 Mart. N. W.
(La) 105; ST. MARYS MACH. CO. v. COOK, 187 Ky.
112, 218 S. W. 733; MONACI v. TURNER et al, 98 Pac.
2d 755; LORRAINE MFG. CO. v. ALLEN MFG. CO.
234 Pac. 1055; ELCO SHOE MFG. CO. v. THATCHER,
203 N. W 669, IOWA MFG CO. v. BALDWIN, 82 S. W.
2d 994; BARRETT CO. v. PANTHER RUBBER MFG.
CO., 24 F. 2d 329; AMERICAN OIL PUMP & TANK CO.
v. FOUST, 274 P. 322, 128 Or. 263, LIQUID CARBONIC
CO. v. COCLIN, 164 S. E. 895, 166 S. C. 400; JONES v.
HOLLAND FURNACE CO., 206 N. W. 56, 188 Wis. 394;
MURRAY CO. v. PUTMAN, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 517, 130
S. W. 631; CHISHOLM & M. MFG. CO. v. UNITED
STATES CANOPY CO., 111 Tenn. 202, 77 S. W. 1062;
AULTMAN & T. MACHINERY CO .v. CAPPLEMAN, 36
Tex. Civ. App. 523, 81 S. W. 1243; JANNEY MFG. CO.
v. BANTA, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1089, 83 S. W. 130.
There can be no question but what the damages here
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sustained were within the contemplation of the parties.
The evidence is conclusive that the truck would not carry
its own weight without blowing out tries, much less any
portion of the road building equipment. After the truck
had been altered the defendant and counter-claimant was
then able to use it for every purpose for which it had been
intended in the first instance. Under the evidence submitted and under the law the Court should have rendered
judgment for the counter-claimant for Twenty Thousand
Dollars and was under obligation to do so. Exhibit 4 is
conclusive evidence of the cost of $25,834.00 to defendant.
Appellee should be embarrased to claim this as speculative
damages.
POINT FIVE

VENDOR RESPONSIBLE TO FURNISH EQUIPMENT CAPABLE OF MOVING ITEMS REPRESENTED
BY VENDEE TO BE MOVED.

The plaintiff knew that the defendant counter-claimant
was in the road constructing business. On Exhibit 1 the
plaintiff represented this equipment was capable of moving
25 tons, and when supplying a truck which costs thousands
of dollars more than the truck described in Exhibit 1,
represented that it would haul at least 25 ton or better.
The evidence shows it would not even move its own weight
when empty without blowing the front tires, much less
25 tons. That the front tires got so hot they smoked,
R 125. From the authorities cited under Point Four, it is
obvious that it was the duty of the Court to render judgment against plaintiff for Twenty Thousand Dollars on the
Counter-Claim.
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POINT SIX

VENDOR CHARGEABLE WITH DAMAGES SUSTAINED DIRECTLY AND NATURALLY RESULTING
AND IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE PARTIES.

The evidence is conclusive that the counter-claimant
was in no position to secure trucks elsewhere, R 39. The
counter-claimant showed by unrefuted evidence that he
sustained a Twenty Thousand Dollar loss by being unable
to secure any trucks elsewhere and the witness of the plaintiff himself testified that the cost of the operation of the
truck was the same as that claimed by the counter-claimant,
R 388, or $5,000.00 for the 63 carloads. This means that
had the Court followed the unrefuted evidence and that
introduced by the plaintiff's own witnesses that the finding
of $20,000.00 for counter-claimant was mandatory.
POINT SEVEN

FINDING THAT DEFENDANT VENDEE WAS
WARNED OF PROBABLE FAILURE OF PERFORMANCE BECAUSE OF LONG WHEEL BASE CONTRARY
TO EVIDENCE.

The evidence of the vendor is no stronger than it is
left at its weakest point on cross-examination, R Q9&. 3 iP a_

Q. Didn't the engineer tell you it wouldn't work?
A:

No, they didn't tell me it wouldn't work.

Q:
A:

Did you think it would work?
Yes, it did work.

Q:

You think you could load 50,000 pounds on it
without blowing the front tires out?
Yes.

A:
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Q:
A:

Do you think you could have done that the way
it was built?
Yes.

R 8-Ht3!b
Q:
A:

They didn't say the truck would be overloaded
on the front wheels?
No.

Q: Just running it empty, they didn't say that?
A:

No.

Please note that the change of mind with respect to
the vendor plaintiH came only after on cross-examination,
counsel requested the Court to order him to bring into I? J
Court the engineer's reports on the construction of the ' \
truck. Having realized that he must now tell the truth on
this matter, he represents to the Court that the truck was
engineered properly to haul 54,000 pounds. How can the
Court under such evidence make a finding that vendee
was warned of failure of performance when even during
the trial the vendor still contends that it was satisfactory
when the evidence was conclusive that the truck would
blow out its front tires when riding empty? And the front
end was over weight because of improper design in balance
when empty.
POINT EIGHT

FINDING THAT VENDEE REQUESTED
TRUCK DELIVERED CONTRARY TO THE
DENCE.

THE
EVI-

The vendor himseH at R 278 admitted that the truck
ordered under Exhibit 1, in his opinion, would not have
been satisfactory, and that he urged the purchase of the
truck ultimately delivered. The plaintiff went to the ven-
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dee's home, and suggested a truck different from that in
Exhibit 1. There is not any evidence of any kind that the
vendor wanted any truck other than the one described in
Exhibit 1 and that he took the truck ultimately delivered
only because of suggestions and representations of the
vendor plaintiff.
POINT NINE

VENDEE OBLIGATED TO CORRECT DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT IS ERROR.
Defendant vendee was unfamiliar with large trucks
and their design. Vendee did not recognize what was
necessary to accomplish the balancing of the truck in the
designing of same. It was not until a newly designed truck
was sent down properly designed with weight balances
that the vendor himself knew what was necessary to do in
order to accomplish the balancing of the equipment to
permit it to operate without blowing out the front tires.
LOUISVILLE N. A. v. SUMNER
106 Ind. 55, 5 N. E. 404
81 A. L. R. 282 at 284
..The rule does not relate to the performance of
the primary obligations of contracts. So, where one
whose duty it is to do work necessary to fulfill a
contract has equal knowledge of the consequences
of noncompliance and opportunity to fulfill the obligation, he alone may be depended on to perform
the duty, and it will not avail him to say the injured
party might have performed the duty for him, and
thus lessened the damages. Louisville, N. A. & C.
R. Co. v. Sumner 1886, 106, Ind. 55, 55 Am. Rep.
719, 5 N. E. 404."
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The Court erred in entering finding paragraph 10, R 57.
There is absolutely no evidence that defendant knew how
to redesign the truck or that he could have found any one
else other than plaintiff who could redesign it. Moreover,
plaintiff could not redesign same until he had a model to
work with. Such a finding cannot sustain the conclusion
of law and the judgment. It was in error under the law
as submitted in the above captioned case, as well as the
facts.
POINT TEN

FINDING THAT VENDEE KNEW WHAT THE
DIFFICULTY WAS, OR COULD HAVE KNOWN BY
EXERCISE OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE.

R 128 indicates that the vendee in attempting to purchase new tires was refused new tires and didn't know the
reason therefore. R 128 indicates that the dealer thought
that the weight was balanced and designed so as to throw
all of the weight on the front. R 129 indicates that the
vendor plaintiff and vendee defendant both went to the
city scales to have the truck weighed and discovered that
the design and balance was such that the truck was overloaded when empty on the front wheels each tire should
carry only 5900 pounds and were required to carry 12,000
pounds with the truck empty. The fact that a model was
used for redesigning of the truck to rebalance the weight
indicates that the vendor designer himself didn't know how
to accomplish the shifting of weights by design. The
vendee had a fourth-grade education and cannot be expected to comprehend truck designing problems that the
vendor himself didnt' recognize. Moreover, under the
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theory of the lower Court, the vendee would be required
to tamper with the vehicle and place himself in a position
where the vendor could then refuse to act, contending that
the tampering with the design itself had relieved vendor
of responsibility and had so modified the construction as
to make it now impossible to properly correct the original
defective design.
Vendor could have contended also that it was the
tampering of the vendee that had caused the unbalanced
condition. The lower Court forces vendee to tamper nevertheless or be precluded from damage .
. Under the Cases Cited and the treatment afforded
Appellant, the Court should grant a new trial, however
since the damages suffered are so definite, and convincing
and conclusive and since the law is certain and no cases
to the contrary the cause should be remanded with instructions to enter judgment for defendant counter-claimant
as proven for $20,000.00 and a new trial ordered only on
items sued for in plaintiff's complaint.
Respectfully submitted,

E. L. SCHOENHALS,
Attorney for Appellant.
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